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Introduction
1 Digital currencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have received much attention in the
media  and  public  debate  in  recent  years.  Their  increasing  importance  has  also
triggered reflection about the role of central banks and traditional forms or systems of
money. While some see these new currencies as a potential threat to the stability of
monetary  systems,  most  commentators  – including  central  bankers  themselves –
acknowledge that the technological innovations associated with digital currencies can
have interesting applications for monetary policy and the control of payments. In fact,
several central banks are currently studying the possibility of issuing their own digital
currencies – variously called Fedcoin (USA)1, e-Peso (Uruguay) or e-krona (Sweden), or,
more generally, Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC). According to researchers from
the  Bureau  of  International  Settlements,  the  current  developments  related  to  the
Covid-19 crisis might indeed speed up the implementation of CBDC (Auer et al., 2020).
For example, in March 2020, the Banque de France launched an experimental program
to test the introduction of a form of CBDC for firms in the Eurosystem.2 In any case,
while their exact form is still unclear, CBDC would allow firms and citizens access to (a
new form of) digital money issued directly by central banks.
2 The  research  literature  on  digital  currencies  in  general,  as  well  as  on  CBDC  in
particular,  is  still  in  its  infancy but  growing at  a  fast  pace.  There is,  of  course,  an
already large literature on Bitcoin and the technological innovations associated with
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digital  currencies  (Böhme,  Edelman  &  Moore,  2015).  The  more  limited  research
literature that concerns CBDC tends to be enthusiastic, arguing that it would provide
central banks with new policy instruments that have the potential to challenge the
influence of private financial institutions and thereby to curb market excesses (Dyson
& Hodgson, 2016; Bordo & Levin, 2017). The literature from central bankers themselves
is more mixed and tends to concern technical details about the consequences of CBDC
for monetary policy and financial stability (Bech & Garrat, 2017; Fung & Alaburda, 2016;
Engert & Fung, 2017; Barontini & Holden, 2019; Boar, Holden & Wadsworth, 2020).
3 The  central  question  of  this  paper  is  whether  CBDC  is  a  desirable  addition  (or
alternative)  to  our  current  monetary system.  To answer this  question,  we mobilize
several strands of political economy research on the strenuous relationship between
private finance and centrale banking (Ingham, 2004; Dyson, 2009; Aglietta, Oul-Ahmed
& Ponsot,  2016;  Gabor,  2016).  This  research conceptualizes  central  banks as  pivotal
institutions in the state-finance nexus, that are tasked to regulate the monetary system
and ensure the confidence of economic agents in it. More precisely, central banks have
traditionally pursued the two main goals of price and financial stability.3 In theory,
they are well positioned to tackle these goals due to their monopoly on the issuance of
legal tender – that is, central bank money – which is located at the very apex of the
financial  system  (Pistor,  2013).  Since  central  bank  money  is  the  ultimate  form  of
settlement  between  economic  agents,  central  banks  can  contribute  to  stable  price
levels by manipulating the price of credit, and to financial stability by acting as lender
and market maker of last resort (Mehrling, 2011).
4 However,  managing these  tasks  has  proven far  from easy:  central  banks  must  also
ensure a high degree of  confidence in their  operations,  from both citizens and the
financial  industry,  to  reach  their  policy  goals  (Goodhart,  2011).  This  system of
confidence in turn relies on “fragile compromises” that are often called into question
because of the unequal, and fundamentally political, relationships between economic
agents and publics authorities (Théret, 2008). These tensions are often most visible in
times of financial crisis, when the interventions of public authorities have both direct
and distributional consequences for the full range of economic agents (Aglietta, Oul-
Ahmed & Ponsot, 2016, P. 73). As a case in point, many researchers have analyzed how
the 2007-2009 global  financial  crisis  revealed a great increase in the structural  and
infrastructural power of financial institutions stemming from the “financialisation” of
Western economies (Dietsch, Claveau & Fontan, 2018). Structural power here refers to
the privileged position of financial institutions in our economies, and infrastructural
power to the fact that they form the channels of transmission of monetary policy. In
turn, this growing financial power creates ethical and policy issues, which undermine
the general level of confidence in the monetary system.
5 It  is  against  this  background of  previous research and debate that  we evaluate the
desirability of  CBDC.  We will  argue that,  on the one hand,  the present state of  the
private financial sector is indefensible and regulators cannot turn a blind eye towards
the problems created by the increased leverage that financial institutions have gained
over the monetary system. On the other hand, implementing CBDC comes with risks of
its own, such as that of creating a “Frankenstein scenario” where too much power is
given to unelected technocrats. Our tentative conclusion is therefore that CBDC should
be seen as a second-best or fall-back option: the primary focus of policy makers should
be on the possibility of reforming or re-regulating the financial sector as such.
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6 The paper is structured as follows: we first give a brief presentation of what CBDC is
and  the  various  alternative  forms  that  central  bankers  currently  are  considering
(section 2). We then say a bit more about how the structural and infrastructural power
of  private  financial  institutions  tends  to  undermine  central  banks’  operations
(section 3).  Thereafter  we  present  how  CBDC  has  the  potential  to  undermine  this
financial  power  of  private  banks  (section 4),  at  the  price  of  serious  drawbacks
pertaining to the democratic control of central banks (section 5). Finally, we draw on
these developments to conclude that CBDC is only a second-best option.
 
1. CBDC: a technological revolution?
7 Most money today is already held in digital form, namely as deposits on accounts in
private banks or other financial institutions (McLeay, Radia & Thomas, 2014). While
bank  deposits  often  seem  interchangeable  for  public  coins  and  notes,  there  is  an
important difference – namely that the deposits are claims on the bank in question and
may therefore be in jeopardy if the bank becomes insolvent (although there is typically
a public deposit guarantee up to a certain amount). Alongside cash and bank deposits,
there is also a third form of money: the deposits that the private banks hold at the
central bank for financial stability and monetary policy purposes, the so-called central
bank  reserves.  This  form  is  also  digital  but  underwritten  by  the  central  bank  and
mainly used to facilitate inter-bank payments.
8 How would CBDC fit into this picture? If implemented, CBDC would be legal tender in a
given monetary zone and labelled in a national currency. It could then take either of
two shapes: it could be a form of digital coin or token, making it more similar to cash;
or it could be a form of digital account, making it more similar to bank deposits and
central bank reserves (Dyson & Hodgson, 2016; Bordo & Levin, 2017, p. 6-8). In practice,
virtually all CBDC proposals are “account-based”, as this option seems both easier to
implement, safer and under direct control of the central bank (Barrdear & Kumhof,
2016; Bordo & Levin, 2017). In essence, then, CBDC is an extension of the system of
central bank reserves to the general public. While only commercial banks (and a few
financial arms of companies) are allowed to take part in that system today, CBDC would
open it up to all citizens and firms.
9 How would people have access to CBDC? There are once again two possible scenarios:
either everyone would hold accounts directly at the central bank, or there would be
indirect accounts available at commercial banks or specific agencies. The possibility of
the first scenario depends on the capacity of modern technology to reduce the cost of
managing millions of accounts significantly enough. For example, Koning’s “Fedcoin”
proposal  assumes  that  the  Federal  Reserve  could  create  a  digital  currency  whose
circulation and emission would be managed through a “distributed ledger” technology,
much  like  Bitcoin  (Koning,  2014).  In  this  scenario,  then,  the  Federal  Reserve  itself
would manage the whole payment system. Alternatively, central banks could leave this
task to commercial banks or specific non-bank intermediaries (Dyson & Hodgson, 2016;
Bordo & Levin, 2017). The money would then stay at the central bank, and be legally its
money, but accredited financial intermediaries would provide access to these accounts
to the public. These intermediaries would be the interface between firms or citizens
and the central bank, and they could also deliver classical banking services labelled in
CBDC.
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10 How would CBDC be introduced into society? The most common scenario is that CBDC
is introduced as a complement to other forms of money, at least in the initial phase.
The  role  of  the  central  bank  could  here  be  either  reactive  or  proactive  (Dyson  &
Hodgson,  2016).  In  the  reactive  scenario,  CBDC  is  simply  offered  as  a  voluntary
alternative.  In  the  proactive  scenario,  the  central  bank  takes  active  measures  to
increase the use of CBDC over time. These measures could in turn vary in strength: for
example, the central bank could set a favorable exchange rate between bank deposits
and CBDC to raise incentives (Bordo & Levin, 2017). Alternatively, it could seek to inject
CBDC directly into the economy.
11 There are several possible channels for the direct introduction of CBDC. For example,
CBDC could be issued through exchanges against government bonds or other financial
assets,  which  is  the  scenario  imagined  by  Barrdear  and  Kumhof  (2016).  Another
suggestion is that central banks should issue CBDC directly to people’s accounts, which
is  sometimes  called  the  “helicopter  drops”  proposal  (Lerven  F  van,  2016).  We  will
return to this last proposal at several points in the paper.
12 Would CBDC accounts function like normal bank accounts,  for  example in accruing
interest over time? Bordo and Levin (2017) and Kumhof and Noone (2018) argue that
CBDC should be remunerated in a way similar to commercial bank accounts. Bordo and
Levin (2017, p. 2) state that interest-bearing CBDC “could constitute a secure store of
value”  and  “the  CBDC  interest  rate  could  serve  as  the  main  tool  for  conducting
monetary  policy”.  An  interesting  feature  is  that  remunerating  CBDC  would  allow
central  banks  to  go  beyond  the  Zero  Lower  Bound  – that  is,  to  set  up  a  more
pronounced negative interest rate. This is difficult in the current system as economic
agents  will  prefer  to  hold  cash  (whose  nominal  yield  is  zero)  rather  than deposits
(whose  nominal  yield  would  be  negative).  Without  cash  as  an  alternative  to  CBDC,
central  banks  could  set  a  negative  interest  rate  on  reserves  and  CBDC  to  boost
investments (Rogoff, 2014; Nabilou, 2020). However, this will only work if all cash is
substituted  for  CBDC,  which  seems  somewhat  unrealistic  (Broadbent,  2016).  Thus,
Dyson  and  Hodgson  (2016,  p. 31)  argue  for  a  purely  cash-like  and  unremunerated
version of CBDC. They contend that remunerating CBDC would be difficult and may
endanger the central bank’s or the state’s budget. Since this latter version seems less
controversial in the debate, we will assume an unremunerated CBDC for the remainder
of this paper.
13 Finally, to what extent would CBDC be similar to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies?
One  of  the  main  issues  here  is  whether  CBDC  requires  some  form  of  centralized
bookkeeping,  as  in  the  current  system,  or  may  rely  on  the  “distributed  ledger”
technology underlying Bitcoin (Broadbent, 2016, p. 5). Bitcoin relies on a decentralized
payment system, which records all transactions on a ledger that is distributed across an
online network; “miners” compete to verify the transaction and the “winner” gets a
reward  for  registering  it  on  the  ledger.  This  technology  has  several  important
properties. First, it is public. Every user can verify and process transactions. Second,
cryptographic technologies secure the ledger against falsifications, without resorting to
any financial institution or central authority. Finally, the fact that the ledger is publicly
available means that Bitcoin can only preserve a “pseudo-anonymity” for its users, who
can be identified by their Bitcoin address (Imwinkelried & Luu, 2015).
14 As  things  stand,  some  central  banks  are  actively  thinking  about  reforms  to  their
centralized  payment  system  (e.g.  Fung  &  Alaburda,  2016;  Engert  &  Fung,  2017).  A
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decentralized  payment  system  would  have  several  advantages,  according  to  some
authors. The main one would be a reduction of the costs of handling payments (for
individuals) and verifying payments (for central banks) since decentralized payment
systems  would  allow  settlements  directly  between  parties,  without  resorting  to  a
central  agency  (Andolfatto,  2015).  It  could  also  make  settlements  of  cross-border
transactions safer and more rapid (Committee, 2018; He et al., 2017). Finally, it could
reduce the risk of technological failure of the payments system: as a larger number of
payment providers will connect to the central bank, the bankruptcy or technological
failure of any single actor would be less likely to threaten the overall system (Dyson &
Hodgson, 2016, p. 10-11).
15 However,  there  are  also  disadvantages  associated  with  a  decentralized  payments
system. The cost-saving property may be exaggerated since making it work on a large
scale can incur huge costs of maintenance, as the case of Bitcoin illustrates (Lambrecht
& Larue, 2018, p. 8-10). Bitcoin’s payment system has also experienced several technical
failures  and  serious  security  breaches  during  its  short  history  (European  Banking
Authority,  2013;  Lambrecht & Larue,  2018,  p. 10-12).  Finally,  Bitcoin’s  proof-of-work
mechanism entails  that  huge amounts  of  computing power is  invested in  “mining”
facilities  by  private  companies,  which  seek  to  get  the  reward  associated  with  the
validation of a transaction. However, since only one miner actually earns the reward,
this means that much energy has been needlessly consumed (Deetman, 2016). Other
algorithms,  such  as  proof-of-stake  protocols,  may  consume  less  computing  power.
However, much research still needs to be done on alternative technologies to alleviate
these problems (Chohan, 2018; Auer, 2019).  Therefore, it  seems that the most likely
scenario is CBDC run on a centralized payment system. In other words, CBDC would
actually be closer to the current system of central bank reserves than to Bitcoin or
other private cryptocurrencies.
 
2. Financial power and central banks’ operations
16 The previous section indicates that there is mixed evidence for the potential of CBDC to
increase the efficiency of the global payment system. Yet, according to its proponents,
CBDC retains at least two other major potential benefits. First, it would provide central
banks  with  an  additional  monetary  policy  option  that  can  be  used  in  economic
downturns,  namely to  credit  citizens’  accounts  directly  (Barrdear  &  Kumhof,  2016,
p. 12; Dyson & Hodgson, 2016; Bordo & Levin, 2017). Second, CBDC has the potential to
reinforce financial stability since it would provide a “safe haven” outside of the private
financial sector (Broadbent, 2016; Dyson & Hodgson, 2016, p. 9-10; Engert & Fung, 2017,
p. 7). Both of these promises rely on a third and more fundamental promise, namely
CBDC’s  ability  to  challenge  the  excessive  level  of  power  held  by  private  financial
institutions over our current monetary system. Before analyzing CBDC’s potential to
solve  these  issues  in  the  next  section,  let  us  take  a  closer  look at  the  connections
between the underlying problems of financial power, financial stability and monetary
policy  options.  These  problems  are  directly  linked  to  the  “financialisation”  of  the
economy  and  the  fragile  compromises  between  economic  agents  that  sustain
confidence in monetary systems.
17 Banks and other private financial institutions wield both structural and infrastructural
power in our current monetary and financial system. Structural power derives from the
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central role they play in our system of payments and credit (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014).
As  we  have  seen,  commercial  bank  deposits  constitute  the  most  abundant  form of
money today. The reason for this is that most money is actually created in the credit or
lending operations of commercial banks (McLeay, Radia & Thomas, 2014). Under the
current system of fractional reserve banking, commercial banks need only keep a small
fraction of their deposit liabilities in either cash or central bank reserves. In essence,
this  means  that  they  can  extend  the  amount  of  private  money  in  circulation  and
acquire a structurally dominant position within the financial system.
18 Moreover, the role of banks in money creation also gives them infrastructural power,
that  is,  they  have  control  over  the  transmission  channels  of  the  central  bank’s
monetary policy (Krippner, 2012; Gabor & Ban, 2016; Braun, 2018). When the central
bank wants to stimulate or decrease economic activity, it has no direct access to the
economic  activities  or  accounts  of  citizens  or  firms.  Instead  its  central  tool  is  to
manipulate  the  interest  rate  on  central  bank  reserves,  which  it  then  hopes  will
“transmit” into changed credit policies on the part of commercial banks. That is, the
central  bank  can  only  steer  the  economy  through  a  close  collaboration  with
commercial  banks  and  the  financial  industry,  which  Braun  (2018)  calls  a  form  of
“infrastructural entanglement”.
19 In  a  historical  context,  the  structural  and  infrastructural  power  of  banks  have
increased  steadily  since  the  1970s  and  -80s,  in  concert  with  the  so-called
financialisation of advanced economies (Strange, 1986; Mehrling 2011). Financialisation
refers to the expansion in size and influence of the financial system that stems from
several  decades  of  financial  deregulation  or  “liberalization”  that  started  with  the
policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Interestingly, it seems that central
banks have encouraged these developments for both ideological and strategic purposes
(Dietsch, Claveau & Fontan, 2018; Braun et al., 2018). First, central bankers believed that
financial  innovations  such as  securitization or  derivatives  help  to  spread risks  and
make markets more stable and efficient (Turner, 2016). Second, central bankers hoped
that these innovations could help them to steer the economy at a distance, through
domestic financial markets (Krippner, 2012; Braun, 2018). For example, the European
Central Bank has promoted the idea of a unified repo market with the hope that it will
foster  economic  convergence  between  Eurozone  countries  (Gabor  &  Ban,  2016).
Moreover, the expansion of the “shadow banking” system – which is the performance
of credit operations and liquidity transformation outside the formal banking system –
has contributed to even further levels of financialisation (Pozsar, 2018).
20 To  many  observers,  the  2007-2009  global  financial  crisis  (GFC)  revealed  the  many
problems inherent in financialisation. By the early 2000’s, many banks had become “too
big to fail” (TBTF); that is, public authorities deemed them so vital to the economy that
they could not be allowed to fail if they were to fall into financial difficulties (Woll,
2014). Moreover, the growing awareness of this situation in the financial sector created
a problem of moral hazard, namely that banks had incentives to take excessive risks
and grow to the point of becoming TBTF (Turner, 2016). Indeed, excessive levels of risk-
taking  and  financial  “innovations”  fueled  a  massive  credit  boom  and  speculative
bubbles on the mortgage markets of the US and other countries. When these financial
imbalances started to unravel in 2007, public authorities were eventually forced to bail
out the financial system which was an enormous cost to the budgets of many states.4 
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21 Several events in the aftermath of the GFC also revealed how central banks have lost
control over their channels of transmission (Braun, 2018). We here focus on central
banks’  purchases  of  financial  securities  on  the  open  market;  the  policy  known  as
quantitative easing (QE). The central idea was to inject liquidity (fresh money) into the
system  and,  through  the  resulting  appreciation  of  financial  prices,  reactivate
commercial lending and stabilize the value of banks’ balance sheets (wealth effect). By
mainly purchasing safer assets (such as sovereign bonds), central banks also hoped to
trigger a portfolio effect; that is, to increase the willingness of financial agents to take
risks and thereby to invest in new enterprises (Bell et al., 2012). Some central banks also
purchased corporate securities, but in a supposedly “market neutral” way (Klooster J.
van’t & Fontan, 2019). What they did was to purchase a broad basket that reflected the
whole universe of high-grade corporate securities, with the aim of easing the financing
conditions of both the emitting firms and, through portfolio rebalancing mechanisms,
also small and medium-sized enterprises.
22 While these QE programs were instrumental for stabilizing financial systems on the
verge  of  collapse,  and  also  mitigating  the  deflationary  tendencies  of  the  resulting
economic shock, it is clear in hindsight that they came with significant negative side-
effects (White, 2012). The most significant problem relates to the moral hazard issue.
Because financial  institutions wield significant structural  and infrastructural  power,
central banks did not “dare” to attach significant conditions to their measures – such
as, for example, a requirement that the provided liquidity is passed on to struggling
enterprises  in  the  real  economy  rather  than  extracted  as  bonuses  to  financial
managers.  There  is  an  ethical  problem  inherent  in  this  development,  namely  that
financial managers could augment their personal wealth during the “boom” phase of
the economy but then avoid the negative financial consequences of the crisis phase
(Godechot, 2016). In other words, financial profits were privatized while financial losses
were socialized (Admati & Hellwig, 2014).
23 Moreover,  the  QE  programs  had  significant  distributive  consequences.  The  direct
wealth  effects  of  asset  purchases  of  course  mainly  benefit  the  owners  of  financial
assets, that is, the economic agents located at the top end of the wealth distribution
spectrum  (Bell  et  al.,  2012).  It  is  yet  unclear  whether  the  indirect  effects  of  QE
(stimulation  of  economic  growth  and  employment)  are  enough  to  mitigate  these
inegalitarian tendencies (Colciago, Samarina & de Haan, 2019). Moreover, the purchase
of corporate securities meant that central banks provided support to several firms with
ethical problems, such as LVMH, Ryanair and Volkswagen (Klooster J. van’t & Fontan,
2019). This practice also had a significant bias in favor of multinational firms with large
carbon footprints, such as Total and Ryanair (Matikainen, Campiglio & Zenghelis, 2017).
These firms are overrepresented in the corporate securities market because they rely
more heavily on external debt financing and can post collateral  against their loans
more easily than their competitors.
24 In sum, the structural and infrastructural power of financial institutions in our current
system tends to undermine financial stability, social justice and, ultimately, probably
also people’s confidence in the monetary system.
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3. The promises of CBDC: a remedy against financial
power?
25 Now, let us return to CBDC and ask: could CBDC solve the problems above? In our view,
the main promise of CBDC is exactly that it seeks to address these problems related to
the inflated power of banks in an increasingly financialised economy.
26 First, CBDC would decrease the structural power of banks, since the economic system
would be less reliant on the stability of private banking. Namely, the introduction of
CBDC would offer an alternative payment system that is not managed by the private
banking sector. People could also choose to hold their savings in an account with the
central bank (or at a private agency connected to the central bank) which by definition
would be safer than a commercial bank account (Broadbent, 2016; Dyson & Hodgson;
2016, p. 9-10; Engert & Fung, 2017, p. 7).  In this way, as noted above, the structural
power of banks is interconnected with issues of financial stability. Since CBDC would
bypass the private banking system, it has the potential to weaken the TBTF problem
and  thereby  to  reduce  the  problems  of  financial  instability  and  moral  hazard.  For
example, when excessive levels of risk-taking within the financial industry translate
into another financial crisis, public authorities would have less incentives to bail out
TBTF institutions since alternative payment systems would be in place and savings
would be located within central banks’ balance sheets. CBDC’s success in these regards
would, of course, depend on the rate of adoption of CBDC among citizens and firms.
27 Second, CBDC could reduce the infrastructural power of banks and thereby help central
banks  to  regain  control  over  their  monetary  policy.  Since  there  would  be  a  direct
monetary channel between central banks, households and firms, central bankers would
not be dependent on financial operators’ willingness to pass on the provided liquidity
in order to have an impact on the economy. Indeed, as we have shown above, the whole
set of unconventional monetary policies that have been implemented since the GFC still
rely on private banks to form the channels of transmission. Instead, CBDC could give
central banks access to a new kind of monetary policy instrument, namely to credit the
accounts of both firms and citizens directly (Barrdear & Kumhof, 2016, p. 12; Dyson &
Hodgson, 2016; Bordo & Levin, 2017). This is of course the “helicopter drops” proposal
which we noted above.
28 The helicopter drops proposal is not new. It was originally a thought experiment of
Milton Friedman (1969) in which he envisioned central banks “dropping” newly created
cash  directly  into  households’  accounts.  The  proposal  is  different  from  the
monetization of government’s deficits, which means that central banks purchase their
debt on primary markets (see Lagerwall, 2019, p. 9-10). In the aftermath of the GFC,
NGOs  and  think  tanks  dusted  off  the  helicopter  drops  proposal  and  called  it
“Quantitative  Easing  for  the  People”;  arguing  that  it  would  allow central  banks  to
support a broader range of policy goals, such as reducing inequality and promoting
environmental  sustainability  (Lerven F.  van,  2016;  Engert  & Fung,  2017,  p. 6).  Some
central bankers are now also discussing helicopter drops as a remedy to the economic
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.5 
29 It  is  not  hard  to  see  why  this  option  would  fare  better  than  regular  QE  in  both
distributive  and  economic  terms.  First,  if  helicopter  drops  were  implemented  with
CBDC, they would have the potential to decrease economic inequalities. For example,
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central banks could credit all citizens’ accounts with a lump sum, or target the least
well-off and transfer CBDC accordingly. Alternatively, central bankers could support
the financing of small and medium-sized firms that do not have access to the corporate
bond market. They would thereby reduce the bias in favor of multinational firms that is
inherent  in  current  purchase  programs  of  corporate  securities.  Second,  helicopter
drops could also fare better than QE in terms of growth dynamics. If we take note of the
fact that bond holders on average are richer than the rest of the population, giving
money directly to people would be a greater stimulus than buying bonds since people’s
marginal propensity to spend tends to decrease with income (Blyth & Lonergan 2014;
Buiter, 2014; Muellbauer, 2014). However, we should note that, although there is an
obvious  connection  between  CBDC  and  the  helicopter  drops  proposal,  the
implementation of the latter would have far-reaching consequences for monetary and
fiscal policy, and for the power balance between central banks and governments. We
discuss these consequences in the next section.
 
4. The perils of CBDC: empowering unelected
technocrats
30 Policy reforms often come with unintended consequences, whose costs might outweigh
their benefits.  Despite its promises, we argue that the CBDC proposal may have the
negative consequences of (1) giving excessive powers to unelected central bankers, and
(2) actually threatening financial stability. Moreover, we also wish to stress that (3)
there may be alternative reforms that address the problems we have outlined above
without triggering such negative consequences. Taken together, these considerations
speak against CBDC as a first-best policy option.
31 (1)  With  regards  to  power,  it  seems clear  that  CBDC could  challenge  the  excessive
power that financial institutions have over our current monetary system. However, it
seems  equally  clear  that  CBDC  comes  with  a  major  drawback  or  unintended
consequence in terms of power balance. Namely, that it would give substantial power
over  our  economies  to  central  banks  and  their  personnel.  In  our  view,  giving
independent central bankers the power to manage and credit private citizens’ accounts
without  an  increased  public  oversight  could  be  called  a  “Frankenstein  scenario”
(Fontan, 2013). The size of the Frankenstein’s creature would of course depend on the
level  of  adoption of  CBDC in  society.  In  any case,  this  scenario  raises  a  number of
ethical and democratic issues.
32 A first  issue  concerns  the  democratic  legitimacy  of  central  banks,  which  is  closely
connected to their mandate (Klooster J.  van’t,  2018).  Most of  modern central  banks
follow a so-called “narrow mandate”, which finds its roots in the myth of Ulysses and
the sirens (Elster, 1979; Conti-Brown, 2016). According to the proponents of this model,
governments cannot resist the calls of the sirens. The most well-known example is that,
in times of elections, public officials have an incentive to manipulate the money supply
in order to boost economic growth and reduce unemployment. However, in the long
run,  or  so  the  argument  goes,  this  will  only  trigger  a  rise  in  prices  and harm the
economy  (Kydland  &  Prescott,  1977).  Accordingly,  social  welfare  is  improved  if
monetary  policy  is  delegated  to  independent  central  bankers,  who,  unlike  elected
officials,  lack  incentives  for  an  excessive  use  of  the  money  supply.  But  when
governments are tied to the mast,  central  bankers should only seek to attain well-
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specified  goals  (such  as  price  or  financial  stability)  with  a  restricted  set  of  policy
instruments (Issing et al., 2001). The current model of independent central banks would
become problematic with a broader mandate that requires trade-offs of a more political
nature (Klooster J. van’t & Fontan, 2019).
33 It seems clear to us that the introduction of CBDC gives rise to several difficult decision
problems  that  are  beyond  the  legitimate  realm  of  central  bankers.  Consider,  for
example, the issues pertaining to financial inclusion. Who should be allowed to open
CBDC accounts? Do you need a specific citizenship or visa to register? These questions
become  even  more  difficult  if  we  factor in  the  “helicopter  drops”  proposal:  What
citizens or firms should receive the money? How much should they get? And should the
amount vary according to wealth and income? These questions go far beyond the realm
of competence and legitimacy of central bankers as we know them: Ulysses did not plan
that his rowers would use other tools than oars when he tied himself to the mast. The
Frankenstein  scenario  is  thus  an  example  of  “agency  shrink”,  which  means  that
independent agencies extend their roles or responsibilities beyond an original contract
of delegation (Elgie, 2002).
34 A second issue concerns the privacy of citizens’ personal data. In our current monetary
system, central bankers have access to information about the financial transactions and
health of private banks and other financial institutions through their supervisory tasks
and open-market  operations.  There are  no particular  worries  about  the fact  that  a
regulatory agency collects data on the institutions that it supervises. However, having
access to such data on private citizens and commercial firms is another matter as it
increases the risk of information misuses by the personnel of the central bank. There is
also an increased risk of so-called regulatory capture, which is known to happen more
often  when  a  given  institution  concentrates  extended  powers  and  responsibilities
(Boyer & Ponce, 2012).
35 There  may  be  remedies  to  both  of  these  issues.  Some  authors  argue  for  better  or
stronger coordination mechanisms between central banks and democratically elected
policy makers. Indeed, they suggest that such coordination mechanisms should have
been in place already in connection with the previous QE programs (Ryan-Collins & van
Lerven, 2018). If CBDC is implemented, it seems clear that the coordination mechanism
would have to reach a whole new level of institutional integration and importance. In
fact, it seems insufficient to just hold public hearings with central bankers to ensure
what  we  may  call  retrospective democratic  consent.  Instead,  prospective democratic
consent would require that elected officials have a direct say in the design of central
bank operations (Klooster J. van’t & Fontan, 2019). For example, mixed committees of
central  bankers  and  Treasury  agents  could  design  the  amount  and  distributional
features of helicopter drops, which then would be implemented via CBDC by central
bankers. This would echo the coordination mechanisms between fiscal and monetary
authorities  during the Bretton-Woods era  when central  banks supported the credit
policies of the state (Ryan-Collins & van Lerven, 2018; Monnet,  2018).  Alternatively,
parliaments or parliamentary bodies could be involved in the design of CDBC-based
helicopter drops. Fiscal-monetary coordination mechanisms exist today in China, South
Korea and Japan, where central banks finance sectors given priority by governments.
36 However, these remedies are unlikely to materialize soon in Western democracies. As
we have seen in previous sections, the policies implemented by central banks since the
GFC  have  already  exceeded  the  remit  of  their  mandates.  Yet,  there  have  been  no
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significant improvements of democratic controls over the Federal Reserve or the ECB,
for instance. This is probably due to deep political divisions in place on both sides of
the  Atlantic,  which  make  it  difficult  to  find  a  political  agreement  about  new
mechanisms of institutional control (Conti-Brown, 2016; Högenauer & Howarth, 2016).
Moreover,  central  bankers themselves are not willing to negotiate about their  high
level of independence, in part because they perceive that it  would undermine their
credibility in the eyes of financial market participants (Goodhart & Lastra, 2018). Thus,
while many central banks are currently considering the implementation of CBDC, none
has suggested deeper coordination mechanisms with elected authorities.
37 (2)  Moving  on  to  the  theme  of  financial  stability,  it  seems  clear  that  CBDC  would
provide a “safe haven” for those that are worried about the instability of the private
banking industry. However, we are once again worried that it can come with certain
unintended consequences, and it may in fact pose new threats to the stability of the
financial system. First, the existence of safer accounts at the central bank may increase
the likelihood of bank runs, that is, situations in which a large number of customers
withdraw their money from a commercial bank at the same time (Camera, 2017, p. 140;
Mancini-Griffoli et al., 2018, p. 21-22). While the system would be more resilient to the
failure  of  one  or  two  commercial  banks  (Broadbent,  2016),  it  may  not  be  able  to
withstand the failure of many of them. Another issue is linked to the fact that, due to
increased competition from public institutions, private banks could lose access to safe
assets to back their lending activities (Committee, 2018, p. 15). That is, CBDC could force
commercial banks to rely on riskier sources of funding, which would make the whole
financial  system  less  stable  (Broadbent,  2016,  p. 3;  Raskin  &  Yermack,  2016,  p. 13).
Finally,  CBDC  might  distract  policymakers  from  the  real  sources  of  economic  and
financial instability in the private sector, which have been propelled by the financial
deregulation  and  innovation  of  the  last  decades,  and,  in  turn,  amplify  financial
instability risks (Dow, 2019).
38 Niepelt (2018) argues that these risks are exaggerated, as current regulations protect
consumers’ accounts against defaults. Similarly, the central bank of Sweden, which is
seriously considering introducing CBDC, has made clear that this would not weaken its
pledge to act as a lender of last resort in case of crisis (Sveriges Riksbank, 2017). But we
may ask whether that pledge will be credible enough. Going back to the Frankenstein
scenario,  it  seems  that  CBDC  puts  a  heavier  weight  on  central  banks  to  safeguard
financial stability in all situations. This is a problem if, for example, the reputation of
the central bank would come into question. Research indicates that a central bank’s
reputation for reliability is crucial for its regulatory and supervisory operations, but
this reputation may come into question due to policy errors and/or technical failures
(Camera, 2017, p. 141; Engert & Fung, 2017, p. 23; Committee, 2018, p. 10). CBDC may
also increase the risk of reputation loss due to conflict of interests, as central bankers
would now be tasked with monetary policy, financial supervision, as well as providing
banking services themselves (either directly or indirectly). In sum, CBDC comes with its
own  challenges  in  terms  of  financial  stability  and  the  balance  of  powers  within
democratic systems. These challenges are even more accentuated when CBDC proposals
are associated with helicopter drops.
(3) In light of these potential shortcomings, can we have our cake and eat it too? Are
there  any  alternative  reforms  that  could  reduce  the  structural  and  infrastructural
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power  of private  banks,  and  increase  financial  stability,  without  the  negative
consequences of CBDC? 
39 As noted above, many of the problems in the financial sector stem from the several
decades of financial deregulation that started with the policies of Reagan and Thatcher
in the 1970s and -80s (Admati and Hellwig, 2014). It does not seem unreasonable, then,
to seek remedies to the problems in some form of re-regulation of the private financial
sector. In the aftermath of the GFC, there was indeed some political momentum for
financial  re-regulation.  Several  of  the  new  regulations  that  came  into  place  were
designed to tackle exactly the problems of TBTF and financial instability. For example,
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed in the US
in 2010. Some of its main provisions were to separate banks’ speculative activities from
their retail operations (the so-called Volcker rule), restrict or regulate trade in very
speculative investments (such as credit default swaps), create a new oversight council
for  financial  stability,  and  increase  the  powers  of  various  financial  supervisory
authorities. In a similar vein, European regulators introduced the Basel III framework
in 2010. Some of its main provisions were to impose higher liquidity ratios and stricter
capital  requirements  on commercial  banks.  Moreover,  the  EU created the  so-called
Single Resolution Mechanism in 2014 in order to have an orderly process of bankruptcy
for financial institutions (which they partly would have to pay for themselves).
40 While we cannot evaluate these policies here,  their appeal lies in their potential  of
addressing the problems of TBTF and financial instability while avoiding the negative
consequences associated with CBDC. For example, challenging the structural power of
commercial banks may not require Frankenstein central banks, but could instead be
done through a re-regulation of the appropriate size and service mix of commercial
banks. Similarly, safeguarding the stability of the financial system may not require the
creation of a “safe haven” outside the private market, but could instead involve the
imposition  of  appropriate  levels  of  risk-taking,  liquidity  and  capital  reserves  on
financial institutions. In fact, Dow (2019) has thoroughly analyzed how re-regulation
measures taken at the national and international level would fare better than CBDC to
regain control over financialized economies.
41 We should acknowledge that re-regulatory efforts have often been criticized for being
too mild and not going far enough (Admati & Hellwig, 2014; Helleiner, 2014; Couppey-
Soubeyran,  2015;  Turner,  2016;  Scialom,  2019).  A  case  in  point  are  the  attempts  of
separating commercial banking from investment banking (such as the US Volcker rule
and the  UK Banking  Act)  which  were  weakened significantly  during  the  legislative
process and may therefore include too many loopholes to end the TBTF problem (Gary,
2011; James, 2018). The recent EU experience is a further case in point: the European
Commission’s proposals on structural banking reforms were shelved in 2018 because of
the  lobbying  efforts  of  large  European  banks6.  In  sum,  despite  partial  regulatory
improvements,  the  lack  of  stringent  structural  reforms  after  the  GFC  allowed  a
resurgence of risky financial activities and unsustainable business model in the banking
industry.
42 If all other reforms to address the TBTF problems were doomed, CBDC could emerge as
a desirable policy option despite its shortcomings. Yet, we can see at least a glimpse of
hope  concerning  the  possibility  of  further  rounds  of  financial  re-regulation  in  the
future.  According  to  researchers  analyzing  the  links  between  financial  policy  and
economic  cycles,  momentum  for  financial  reform  tends  to  reappear  in  financial
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downturns when the underlying problems are more salient and regulators are under
public pressure (McDonnel, 2013; Dagher, 2018). In other words, while the 2007-2009
GFC was a missed opportunity to end the TBTF problem (partly because there was no
alternative policy blueprint ready at the time), there is reason to believe that things
might be different when the next financial crisis hits.
 
Concluding remarks
43 In  this  paper,  we  have  investigated  whether  CBDC  is  a  desirable  addition  (or
alternative) to our current monetary system. Our main contribution has been to give a
broader and more balanced perspective than the existing literature, highlighting both
the promises and perils of CBDC in terms of circumventing financial power. We have
argued  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  present  state  of  the  private  financial  sector  is
indefensible and regulators cannot turn a blind eye towards the problems created by
the structural and infrastructural power of financial institutions. On the other hand,
implementing  CBDC  comes  with  risks  of  its  own,  such  as  that  of  creating  a
“Frankenstein scenario” where too much power is given to unelected technocrats. This
dilemma is related to the pivotal but difficult role of central banks that we highlighted
in the introduction.  On the one hand,  central  banks must ensure a certain level  of
confidence in the monetary system: they need to control the channels of transmission
of monetary policy and avoid creating situations of moral hazard when they intervene
in the financial system. On the other hand, if they exert an excessive level of control
over the production of money and the allowance of credit they go far beyond the remit
of their mandates – and the confidence of both economic agents and the general public
can also be undermined.
44 In  light  of  this  dilemma,  we have argued that  a  careful  evaluation of  CBDC should
compare it to the best alternative policy options, such as financial re-regulation. It does
not seem ruled out that there are other ways to tackle the underlying problems of
financial power, financial instability and monetary policy options while avoiding the
negative consequences of CBDC. Our tentative conclusion is therefore that CBDC should
be seen as a second-best or fall-back option, while the primary focus of policy makers
should be on the possibility of reforming or re-regulating the financial sector as such.
The fall-back option should only be activated if it becomes obvious that financial re-
regulation is impossible for political or other reasons, but we do not believe that this
day  has  come  yet.  If  CBDC  is  implemented  after  all,  there  should  be  a  serious
reconsideration of the accountability procedures imposed on central bankers, in order
to ensure that their increased powers also come with increased responsibility.
Braun B., Gabor D. & M. Hübner (2018), « Governing through financial markets: Towards a critical
political economy of Capital Markets Union », Competition & Change, vol. 22, no 2, p. 101-116.
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NOTES
1. Two US senators have recently asked the Federal Reserve to seriously consider its
implementation  (French  Hill  &  Bill  Foster,  Letter  to  the  chairman  Jay  Powell,
September 30, 2019).
2. « Expérimentations de la Banque de France sur la monnaie digitale de banque centrale : appel à
candidature »,  March 27,  2020.  URL:  https://www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/media/
2020/03/27/200327-note-information-monnaie-digitale-de-banque-centrale.pdf [accessed  on
08/12/2020]
3. The mandates of central banks have varied over space and time (sometimes including goals
like full employment and reduced national debts), but these two goals remain constant.
4. The cost of bailing out the banking system varied between different countries. For example,
the cost  of  Ireland’s  interventions amounted to 22% of  its  GDP,  while  France’s  interventions
turned out to be less costly (Woll, 2014, p. 35).
5. The  governor  of  the  Banque  de  France  has  hinted  that  the  option  of  providing  liquidity
directly to firms is on the table (Arnold, 2020).
6. « Proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  european  parliament  and  of  the  council  on  structural
measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions »,  January 29, 2014. URL: https://
ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-supervision-and-risk-
management/managing-risks-banks-and-financial-institutions/structural-reform-eu-banking-
sector_en [accessed on 17/06/2020]
ABSTRACTS
This paper analyzes the proposal that central banks should issue digital currencies (CBDC) to
provide a public alternative to private digital accounts and cryptocurrencies. We build on some
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recent themes in political economy research to give a broader and more balanced perspective
than the existing literature, highlighting both the promises and perils of CBDC. We argue that, on
the one hand,  the present state of  the private financial  sector is  problematic and regulators
should seek to tackle the issues of financial  power,  financial  instability and lack of adequate
monetary policy options. On the other hand, implementing CBDC comes with risks of its own,
such as that of creating a “Frankenstein scenario” where too much power is given to unelected
technocrats. Our tentative conclusion is therefore that CBDC should be seen as a second-best
option, while the primary focus of policy makers should be on the possibility of financial re-
regulation.
Cet  article  analyse  la  proposition selon laquelle  les  banques  centrales  devraient  émettre  des
monnaies numériques de banque centrale (CBDC) dans le but de fournir une alternative publique
aux  monnaies  numériques  privées.  Nous  nous  appuyons  sur  certains  thèmes  de  recherche
récents en économie politique afin de donner une perspective plus large et plus équilibrée que ne
le fait la littérature existante sur le sujet, en soulignant à la fois les promesses et les dangers de
ces  monnaies.  Nous  soutenons,  d’une  part,  que  le  secteur  financier  privé  actuel  confère  un
pouvoir  excessif  à  certaines  institutions  privées,  souffre  d’instabilité  financière  et  échoue  à
apporter des options adéquates en matière de politique monétaire. D’autre part, la mise en place
des CBDC comporte des risques propres, comme celui d’enclencher un "scénario Frankenstein"
dans lequel trop de pouvoir se trouve octroyé à des technocrates non élus.  Notre conclusion
provisoire est donc que les CBDC devraient être considérées comme une option de second choix,
tandis que les décideurs politiques gagneraient à se concentrer principalement sur la possibilité
d’une re-réglementation financière.
Este artículo analiza la propuesta según la cual los bancos centrales deberían emitir monedas
numéricas del banco central (CBDC) con el objetivo de proporcionar una alterantiva pública a las
monedas numéricas privadas. Nos apoyamos sobre ciertos temas de investigación recientes en
economía política con el fin de dar una perspectiva mas amplia y mas equilibrada, cosa que no
hace la literatura existente sobre este tema, destacando a la vez las promesas y los peligros de
esas monedas. Nosotros sostenemos, por una parte, que el sector financiero privado actual otorga
un poder  excesivo  a  ciertas  instituciones  privadas,  pero  sufre  una  inestabilidad  financiera  y
fracasa para aportar opciones adecuadas en materia de politicas monetarias. Por otra parte, la
puesta en funciones de las CBDC tiene sus propios riesgos, como por ejemplo desencadenar un
escenario de tipo « Frankestein » en el cual un gran poder se encuentra otorgado a tecnócratas
que no han sido electos. Nuestra conclusión provisoria es entonces que los CBDC deberían ser
considerados como una opción de segundo rango, mientras que los políticos que tienen poder
para  decidir  ganarían  si  se  concentraran  principalmente  en  la  posibilidad  de  una  re-
reglamentación financiera.
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